In this paper, we investigate Rosser provability predicates whose provability logics are normal modal logics. First, we prove that there exists a Rosser provability predicate whose provability logic is exactly the normal modal logic KD. Secondly, we introduce a new normal modal logic KDR which is a proper extension of KD, and prove that there exists a Rosser provability predicate whose provability logic includes KDR.
Introduction
In the paper [9] , we raised the problem of the existence of a Σ 2 representation of each theory T such that the provability logic of the provability predicate of T constructed from the representation is exactly the modal logic KD = K + ¬ ⊥. This problem has not been settled yet. Here we consider the following more general question: Is there a provability predicate whose provability logic is exactly KD? In this paper, we give an affirmative answer to this problem by considering Rosser provability predicates.
Let T be any consistent recursively enumerable extension of Peano Arithmetic PA. We say a formula Pr T (x) is a provability predicate of T if it weakly represents the set of all theorems of T in PA, that is, for any natural number n, PA ⊢ Pr T (n) if and only if n is the Gödel number of some theorem of T . An arithmetical interpretation based on Pr T (x) is a mapping f from modal formulas to sentences of arithmetic such that f commutes with every propositional connective and f maps to Pr T (x). Let PL(Pr T ) be the set of all modal formulas A such that T ⊢ f (A) for any arithmetical interpretation f based on Pr T (x). This set is called the provability logic of Pr T (x). Solovay [18] proved that for each standard Σ 1 provability predicate Pr T (x) of T , if T is Σ 1 -sound, then the provability logic of Pr T (x) is equal to the modal logic GL. This is Solovay's arithmetical completeness theorem.
On the other hand, Feferman [4] found a Π 1 representation of a theory T such that the consistency statement defined by using the provability predicate Pr F T (x) constructed from the representation is provable in PA. The provability logic PL(Pr F T ) of Feferman's predicate includes the modal logic KD, and it is completely different from GL. The problem of exact axiomatization of PL(Pr F T ) was studied by Montagna [11] and Visser [19] , but it has not been settled yet. Shavrukov [16] found a Feferman-like Σ 2 provability predicate whose provability logic is exactly the modal logic KD + p → (( q → q) ∨ p).
Rosser provability predicate Pr R T (x) was essentially introduced by Rosser [13] to improve Gödel's first incompleteness theorem. It is wellknown that the consistency statement defined by Pr R T (x) is provable in PA. Then by the proof of Gödel's second incompleteness theorem, at least one of the principles (K): (p → q) → ( p → q) and (4) : p → p is invalid for each Rosser provability predicate (Whether the principle (K) is valid for Rosser provability predicates was asked by Kreisel and Takeuti [7] ). Actually, Guaspari and Solovay [5] and Arai [1] showed that whether (K) or (4) is invalid for Pr R T (x) is dependent on the choice of Pr R T (x). More precisely, by using the modal logical result of Guaspari and Solovay, it can be shown that there exists a Rosser provability predicate for which both of these principles are not valid. Also Arai proved the existence of a Rosser provability predicate satisfying (K) and a Rosser provability predicate satisfying (4) .
Modal logical investigations of Rosser provability predicates were initiated by Guaspari and Solovay, and continued by Visser [19] , Shavrukov [15] and others. In particular, Shavrukov introduced the bimodal logic GR for usual provability and Rosser provability, and proved the arithmetical completeness theorem for GR. Although Shavrukov's arithmetically complete logic GR does not contain (K) for the modality of Rosser provability as an axiom, it is worth considering (K) for Rosser provability from modal logical viewpoint. That is, it is easy to show that the provability logic PL(Pr R T ) is a normal modal logic if and only if (K) is valid for Pr
In this paper, we investigate Rosser provability predicates whose provability logics are normal. In Section 3, we give an affirmative answer to the problem raised in the first paragraph of this section, that is, we prove that there exists a Rosser provability predicate Pr R T (x) of T such that PL(Pr R T ) is exactly KD. In Section 4, we introduce and study a new normal modal logic KDR = KD + ¬p → ¬ p. In particular, we prove that there exists a Rosser provability predicate Pr R T (x) of T such that KDR ⊆ PL(Pr R T ). Thus we obtain a Rosser provability predicate whose provability logic is a proper extension of KD. Whether there exists a Rosser provability predicate whose provability logic is exactly KDR is still open.
Preliminaries
The axioms of the modal logic K are all propositional tautologies in the language of propositional modal logic and the formula (p → q) → ( p → q). The inference rules for K are modus ponens, necessitation and substitution. Each modal logic L is identified with the set of all theorems of L. We say a modal logic L is normal if K ⊆ L and L is closed under modus ponens, necessitation and substitution. For any modal logic L and modal formula A, let L + A denote the least normal modal logic whose axioms are those of L and the formula A. Several normal modal logics are obtained by adding axioms to K as follows (see [2, 3] for more details):
A Kripke frame is a tuple (W, ≺) where W is a nonempty set and ≺ is a binary relation on W . A Kripke model is a tuple M = (W, ≺, ) where (W, ≺) is a Kripke frame, and is a binary relation between W and the set of all modal formulas satisfying the usual conditions for satisfaction and the following condition: x A if and only if for all y ∈ W , y A if x ≺ y. We say a modal formula A is valid in a Kripke model M = (W, ≺, ) if for all w ∈ W , w A. We say that M is finite if W is finite. Also we say that M is serial if for any x ∈ W , there exists y ∈ W such that x ≺ y.
It is known that the modal logic KD is sound and complete with respect to the class of all finite serial Kripke models. Moreover, the following theorem holds. Theorem 2.1 (Kripke completeness theorem for KD (see [12] )). For each modal formula A which is not provable in KD, we can primitive recursively find a finite serial Kripke model in which A is not valid.
Throughout this paper, we assume that T always denotes a recursively enumerable consistent extension of Peano Arithmetic PA in the language L A of first-order arithmetic. We also assume that L A contains function symbols for all primitive recursive functions. Let ω be the set of all natural numbers. For each n ∈ ω, the numeral for n is denoted by n. We fix a natural Gödel numbering such that 0 is not a Gödel number of any object, and that the Gödel number of n is larger than n. For each L A -formula ϕ, let ϕ be the numeral for the Gödel number of ϕ. Let {ϕ k } k∈ω be the repetition-free effective sequence of all formulas arranged in ascending order of whose Gödel numbers. We assume that if ϕ k is a subformula of ϕ l , then k ≤ l.
We say a formula Pr T (x) is a provability predicate of T if for any n ∈ ω, PA ⊢ Pr T (n) if and only if n is the Gödel number of some T -provable formula. We fix a ∆ 1 (PA) formula Proof T (x, y) which is a natural formalization of the relation "y is a T -proof of a formula x" with the usual adequate properties. Let Prov T (x) be the formula ∃yProof T (x, y). Then Prov T (x) is a provability predicate of T satisfying several conditions such as
. Let Con T be the sentence ¬Prov T ( 0 = 1 ) expressing the consistency of T . We say a formula Prf T (x, y) is a proof predicate of T if Prf T (x, y) satisfies the following conditions:
Here N is the standard model of arithmetic. The last clause means that our proof predicates are single conclusion ones. For each proof predicate Prf T (x, y) of T , the Σ 1 formula
is said to be the Rosser provability predicate of Prf T (x, y) or a Rosser provability predicate of T , where ¬(x) is a term corresponding to a primitive recursive function calculating the Gödel number of ¬ϕ from the Gödel number of a formula ϕ. Each Rosser provability predicate of T is a provability predicate of T . Also the following proposition holds. Let Pr T (x) be any provability predicate of T . A mapping f from the set of all modal formulas to the set of all L A -sentences is said to be an arithmetical interpretation based on Pr T (x) if f satisfies the following conditions:
The set PL(Pr T ) = {A : A is a modal formula and for all arithmetical interpretations f based on Pr T (x), T ⊢ f (A)} is called the provability logic of Pr T (x). One of the major achievements of the investigation of provability logics is Solovay's arithmetical completeness theorem (see [2, 17, 18] ). Provability logics of nonstandard provability predicates have been also studied by many authors. Feferman [4] found a nonstandard Σ 2 provability predicate Pr F T (x) such that KD ⊆ PL(Pr F T ) (see also [11, 19] ). Shavrukov [16] found a Feferman-like Σ 2 provability predicate whose provability logic is exactly KD + p → (( q → q) ∨ p). Also it was proved in [8, 9] 
In this paper, we are interested in the provability logics PL(Pr R T ) of Rosser provability predicates Pr R T (x). In particular, we study the situation where PL(Pr R T ) is a normal modal logic. We introduce the following terminology.
Definition 2.4. A Rosser provability predicate Pr
It is easy to show the following proposition. 
for any sentences ϕ and ψ.
We can define a Rosser provability predicate which is not normal by using modal logical results of Guaspari and Solovay [5] or Shavrukov [15] . On the other hand, Arai [1] defined a normal Rosser provability predicate (This was also mentioned by Shavrukov [15] ). Thus whether Pr R T (x) is normal or not is dependent on the choice of Pr R T (x). Model theoretic properties of normal Rosser provability predicates were investigated by Kikuchi and Kurahashi [6] .
We say an L A -formula ϕ is propositionally atomic if it is not a Boolean combination of proper subformulas of ϕ. We prepare a new propositional variable p ϕ for each propositionally atomic formula ϕ. Then there exists a primitive recursive injection I from L A -formulas to propositional formulas satisfying the following conditions:
1. I(ϕ) ≡ p ϕ for each propositionally atomic ϕ, 2. I commutes with every propositional connective.
Let X be any finite set of L A -formulas. We say X is propositionally satisfiable if the set I(X) = {I(ϕ) : ϕ ∈ X} of propositional formulas is satisfiable. An L A -formula ψ is said to be a tautological consequence (t.c.) of X if I(ψ) is a tautological consequence of I(X). The above definitions are formalized in PA, and PA can prove several facts about them. For instance, PA proves that "If X ∪ {ϕ} is not propositionally satisfiable for a finite set X of formulas and a formula ϕ, then ¬ϕ is a t.c. of X." Define P T,n to be the finite set {ϕ : N |= ∃y ≤ nProof T ( ϕ , y)} of formulas. Then PA proves "If a formula ϕ is a t.c. of P T,n for some n, then ϕ is provable in T ", and so on.
The arithmetical completeness theorem for KD
In this section, we prove that there exists a normal Rosser provability predicate of T whose provability logic is exactly the modal logic KD. Let {A k } k∈ω be a primitive recursive enumeration of all modal formulas that are not provable in KD. From each A k , we can primitive recursively construct a finite serial Kripke model M k = (W k , ≺ k , k ) in which A k is not valid by Theorem 2.1. We may assume that W k and W l for k = l are pairwise disjoint sets of natural numbers and k∈ω W k = ω \{0}. We define an infinite Kripke model M = (W, ≺, ) which can be primitive recursively represented in PA as follows:
2. x ≺ y if and only if for some k ∈ ω, x, y ∈ W k and x ≺ k y, 3. x p if and only if for some k ∈ ω, x ∈ W k and x k p.
First, we define a primitive recursive function h(x) by using the recursion theorem as follows:
Here S(x) is the Σ 1 formula ∃v(h(v) = x). The sentence S(j) is propositionally atiomic because it is an existential sentence. Suppose that P T,m is propositionally satisfiable and ¬S(j) is a t.c. of P T,m . Then there exists a formula ϕ ∈ P T,m containing S(j) as a subformula. Hence j ≤ m. Thus {j ∈ W : ¬S(j) is a t.c. of P T,m } = ∅ if and only if there exists j ≤ m such that ¬S(j) is a t.c. of P T,m . Notice that this equivalence also holds when P T,m is not propositionally satisfiable. From this observation, for each m, whether {j ∈ W : ¬S(j) is a t.c. of P T,m } is empty or not can be primitive recursively determined. This guarantees that h(x) is a primitive recursive function.
By the definition of the function h(x), we obtain the following lemma.
Lemma 3.2.
2. PA ⊢ ∀x∀y(0 < x < y ∧ S(x) → ¬S(y)).
The sentences ¬Con
T , ∃x(Prov T ( ¬S(ẋ) )∧x = 0) and ∃x(S(x)∧ x = 0) are equivalent in PA.
For any i = 0, T ¬S(i).
Proof. 1 is proved by induction in PA. 2 follows from 1 immediately.
is contained in P T,m for some m. In this case, ¬S(i) is a t.c. of P T,m . Hence {j ∈ W : ¬S(j) is a t.c. of P T,n } is not empty for some n. For the least such n, h(n + 1) = 0.
We prove PA ⊢ ∃x(S(x) ∧ x = 0) → ¬Con T . We reason in PA: Suppose S(i) holds and i = 0. Then there exists m such that h(m) = 0 and h(m + 1) = i. In this case, i = min{j ∈ W : ¬S(j) is a t.c. of P T,m }, and hence ¬S(i) is a t.c. of P T,m . Then ¬S(i) is provable in T . On the other hand, the sentence S(i) is provable in T because it is a true Σ 1 sentence. Therefore T is inconsistent.
This contradicts the consistency of T . Thus T ¬S(i). ❑
For each i ∈ W , the set {j ∈ W : i ≺ j} is finite and nonempty because the Kripke model M is a disjoint union of finite serial Kripke models. We can use the sentence i≺j S(j) which contains at least one disjunct.
We define a PA-provably recursive function g(x) which enumerates all theorems of T . We start defining the function g(x). In the definition of g(x), we identify each formula with its Gödel number. • If h(m + 1) = 0, then go to Procedure 2.
Procedure 2. Let m be the smallest number such that h(m+1) = 0. Let i = min{j ∈ W : ¬S(j) is a t.c. of P T,m } and let X be the finite set P T,m−1 ∪ i≺j S(j) of formulas. Then i = h(m + 1). Let {ϕ k } k∈ω be the sequence of all formulas introduced in Section 2.
We define the values of g(m), g(m+1), . . . and the numbers {t k } k∈ω simultaneously in stages. Let t 0 = 0. Stage 2.k: We distinguish the following three cases C1, C2 and C3.
C1 If ϕ k is a t.c. of X, then let g(m + t k ) = ϕ k and t k+1 = t k + 1.
C2 If ϕ k is not a t.c. of X and ¬ϕ k is a t.c. of X, then let g(m + t k ) = ¬ϕ k , g(m + t k + 1) = ϕ k and t k+1 = t k + 2.
C3 If neither ϕ k nor ¬ϕ k is a t.c. of X, then for each 0 ≤ s ≤ m, let
Go to stage 2.(k + 1). The definition of g(x) has just been finished. Let Prf g (x, y) be the ∆ 1 (PA) formula x = g(y) ∧ Fml(x), where Fml(x) is a natural ∆ 1 (PA) representation of "x is an L A -formula". Also let Pr g (x) and Pr R g (x) be the formula ∃yPrf g (x, y) and the Rosser provability predicate of Prf g (x, y), respectively. Actually, our formula Prf g (x, y) is a proof predicate of T . Lemma 3.3.
2. For any n ∈ ω and formula ϕ, N |= Proof T ( ϕ , n) ↔ Prf g ( ϕ , n). Pr g (x) ) by Lemma 3.2.3. Thus we obtain PA ⊢ ∀x(Prov T (x) ↔ Pr g (x)).
Proof. 1. It is clear that ¬∃x(S(x) ∧
2. By Lemma 3.2.3, ¬∃x(S(x) ∧ x = 0) is true in N. Then Proof T ( ϕ , n) and Prf g ( ϕ , n) are equivalent in N by the definition of g(x). ❑ 
2. X is propositionally satisfiable.
If a formula ϕ is a t.c. of X, then Pr
Proof. We reason in PA. Let i and m be such that h(m) = 0 and h(m + 1) = i. In this case, i = min{j ∈ W : ¬S(j) is a t.c. of P T,m }.
is also a t.c. of P T,m−1 . This means ¬S(j 0 ) is a t.c. of P T,m−1 . Then {j ∈ W : ¬S(j) is a t.c. of P T,m−1 } is not empty, and hence h(m) = 0. This is a contradiction. Therefore ¬S(j 0 ) is not a t.c. of X.
2. Since ≺ is serial, there exists at least one j 0 such that j 0 ≻ i. Then X ∪ {S(j 0 )} is propositionally satisfiable by 1. It follows that X is propositionally satisfiable.
3. Suppose ϕ is a t.c. of X. For the enumeration {ϕ k } k∈ω used in the definition of g(x), let ϕ = ϕ k . Then g(m + t k ) = ϕ by C1. Since X is propositionally satisfiable by 2, ¬ϕ / ∈ X. Hence ¬ϕ / ∈ P T,m−1 . Therefore ¬ϕ / ∈ {g(0), . . . , g(m − 1)} because the construction of g(x) is switched to Procedure 2 at Stage 1.m. Also ¬ϕ = ϕ k ′ for all k ′ ≤ k. Let ϕ l be a formula obtained by deleting zero or more leading negation symbols ¬ from ϕ. Then l ≤ k and exactly one of ϕ l and ¬ϕ l is a t.c. of X. Thus ¬ϕ is not output at Stage 2.l by the definition of g(x). Therefore ¬ϕ is not output before Stage 2.k. This means that Pr R g ( ϕ ) holds.
4. Suppose that ψ is not a t.c. of X. Then ψ / ∈ {g(0), . . . , g(m− 1)} since ψ is not contained in X. We distinguish the following two cases.
• Case 1: ¬ψ is a t.c. of X. Let ψ = ϕ k . Then g(m + t k ) = ¬ψ by C2. Also ψ = ϕ k ′ for all k ′ < k. If ψ is of the form ¬ϕ l for some l < k, then ϕ l is a t.c. of X. Hence g(m + t l ) = ϕ l by C1, and ψ is not output at Stage 2.l. Also let ϕ p be a formula obtained by deleting zero or more leading ¬'s from ψ, then exactly one of ϕ p and ¬ϕ p is a t.c. of X. Hence ϕ p is output by C1 or C2, and ψ is not output at Stage 2.p if p < k. Therefore ψ is not output before Stage 2.k. Thus Pr R g ( ψ ) does not hold.
• Case 2: ¬ψ is not a t.c. of X. Let ϕ k be a formula obtained by deleting all leading ¬'s from ψ. Then ϕ k does not appear before Stage 2.k. Since neither ϕ k nor ¬ϕ k is a t.c. of X, g(m+t k +s) =
Let n be the number of deleted negation symbols from ψ. Notice that ¬S(i) is not a t.c. of P T,n by Lemma 3.2.4 (because n is standard). Hence m > n holds. Thus for s = m−n−1, g(m+t k +s) = ¬ψ and g(m+t k +s+1) = ψ. Therefore Pr R g ( ψ ) does not hold. ❑ Lemma 3.5. Let i, k ∈ W and suppose i ≺ k.
Proof. Suppose i ≺ k. We reason in PA + S(i): Let m be such that h(m) = 0 and h(m + 1) = i. Let X = P T,m−1 ∪ i≺j S(j) . Since i≺j S(j) is a t.c. of X, Pr Lemma 3.7. Let i ∈ W and A be any modal formula.
If
i A, then PA ⊢ S(i) → f (A).
If i A, then PA ⊢ S(i) → ¬f (A).
Proof. We prove 1 and 2 simultaneously by induction on the construction of A. We give a proof only for the case that A is of the form B.
1. Suppose i B. Then for any j ≻ i, j B. By induction hypothesis, PA ⊢ i≺j S(j) → f (B). By Lemmas 3.3 and
Then there exists j ∈ W such that i ≺ j and j B. By induction hypothesis, we have PA ⊢ S(j) → ¬f (B). By Lemmas 3.3 and 3.6, PA ⊢ ¬Pr
We finish the proof of Theorem 3.1.
Proof of Theorem 3.1. 1. Arithmetical soundness follows from Lemmas 3.3 and 3.6. 2. Suppose KD A. Then there exists i ∈ W such that i A. By Lemma 3.7, PA ⊢ S(i) → ¬f (A). Since T ¬S(i) by Lemma 3.2.4, we obtain T f (A). ❑ Notice that our arithmetical interpretation f maps each propositional variable to a Σ 1 sentence. We say such an arithmetical interpretation a Σ 1 arithmetical interpretation. Then we obtain the following corollary. 
For any normal Rosser provability predicate Pr

Normal modal logic KDR
It is known that the formalized version of Proposition 2.2 is provable in PA, that is, for any formula ϕ, PA ⊢ Prov T ( ¬ϕ ) → Prov T ( ¬Pr R T ( ϕ ) ) (see [15] ). Relating to this observation, in this section, we consider the following condition for Rosser provability predicates:
For any sentence ϕ, T ⊢ Pr
We introduce a new normal modal logic KDR. Since KD ¬p → ¬ p, KDR is a proper extension of KD, and hence the condition (1) is not valid for some Rosser provability predicate by Theorem 3.1.
It is easy to show that the validity of the modal formula ¬p → ¬ p in a Kripke frame F = (W, ≺) is characterized by the condition
We say a Kripke model M = (W, ≺, ) is a KDR-model if ≺ is serial and satisfies the condition (2). Then it is proved that KDR is sound and complete with respect to the class of all KDR-models (This follows from Theorem 3 in Boolos [2] p. 89 because KDR is K{(0, 0, 1, 1), (0, 1, 1, 1)} in the terminology of Boolos). 1. KDR ⊢ A.
A is valid in all KDR-models.
Here we give an alternative axiomatization of KDR.
Definition 4.3.
Let KR
2. Let KR + be the logic obtained by adding the inference rule A A to KR. • W ′ = W ∪ {0}, where 0 is an element not contained in W ,
Then M ′ is also a KDR-model. Since 0 A, we obtain KDR A by Proposition 4.2 again. ❑
In Theorem 4.6 below, we prove the existence of a normal Rosser provability predicate Pr 
by the supposition, and hence T ⊢ ¬Con T → ¬ϕ. By the formalized version of Rosser's first incompleteness theorem, we have T ⊢ Prov T ( ¬ϕ ) → ¬Con T (see [10] ). Thus T ⊢ Prov T ( ¬ϕ ) → ¬ϕ. By Löb's theorem, we obtain T ⊢ ¬ϕ. Then T is inconsistent by Rosser's first incompleteness theorem. This is a contradiction. ❑
We prove the main theorem of this section.
Theorem 4.6. There exists a normal Rosser provability predicate Pr
Proof. We define a PA-provably recursive function g ′ (x) in stages. The corresponding formulas Prf g ′ (x, y), Pr g ′ (x) and Pr R g ′ (x) are defined as in the proof of Theorem 3.1. In the definition of g ′ (x), we can refer to our defining formula Pr R g ′ (x) with the aid of the recursion theorem. For each natural number m, let F m be the set of all formulas whose Gödel numbers are less than or equal to m. First, we define an increasing sequence {Y i m } i∈ω of finite sets of formulas recursively as follows:
Notice that the definition of Y m refers to the formula Pr • If Y m is not propositionally satisfiable, then go to Procedure 2. 
Every element of X is provable in T .
3. Suppose for all j < i, there exists no formula ϕ such that ¬Pr 
3. This is proved in a similar way as in our proof of 2. ❑ Lemma 4.8.
2. For any n ∈ ω, PA ⊢"Y n is propositionally satisfiable".
Proof. 1. We proceed in PA. 
(←): Suppose that T is inconsistent. Then P T,m is not propositionally satisfiable for some m. Therefore Y m is not propositionally satisfiable for some m.
2. By 1, for any n ∈ ω, the Σ 1 sentence "Y n is propositionally satisfiable" is true, and hence provable in PA. ❑ Our formula Prf g ′ (x, y) is a proof predicate of T .
Lemma 4.9.
2. For any n ∈ ω and formula ϕ, N |= Proof T ( ϕ , n) ↔ Prf g ′ ( ϕ , n).
Proof. From Lemma 4.8, this is proved in a similar way as in our proof of Lemma 3.3. ❑ Lemma 4.10. Let ϕ and ψ be any formulas.
Proof. Let U = PA + Con T . By Lemma 4.8.1, U proves ∀x"Y x is propositionally satisfiable". Then by the definition of g ′ (x), the formulas Prov T (x), Pr g ′ (x) and Pr
outputs ¬ϕ before any output of ϕ since T is consistent, and this fact is provable in T . Hence T proves ¬Pr
holds by the equivalence of Prov T (x) and Pr R g ′ (x). ❑ Lemma 4.11. Let ϕ and ψ be any formulas. 
❑ By Lemmas 4.9, 4.10 and 4.11, we conclude KDR ⊆ PL(Pr R g ′ ). ❑ Let F be Shavrukov's modal logic KD + p → (( q → q) ∨ p) [16] . It is easy to see that F is included in KD4 ∩ T. Also we obtain the following proposition. Then we have shown T ⊢ ¬α. On the other hand, the sentence α is an arithmetical instance of a modal formula which is in KD5 ∩ KD4 ∩ T. Therefore we conclude KD5 ∩ KD4 ∩ T PL(Pr Here x→y is a primitive recursive term corresponding to a primitive recursive function calculating the Gödel number of ϕ → ψ from Gödel numbers of ϕ and ψ. We can say the same comment for Theorem 4.6. We close this paper with the following problem.
Problem 4.15. 
Is there a Rosser provability predicate Pr
